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Dual enlargement of the EU and NATO has the potential to generate asymmetric security impacts
within Euro-Atlantic region. The room for asymmetric impacts are between existing NATO and EU
member states, between new and old NATO and EU members; between three security policies,
between EU and NATO member states and those that will integrate in the year 2004.
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1. Introduction
In the post-Cold war era the EU and NATO
and other multilateral institutions have found it very
difficult to articulate in an agreed way their roles
and compatibility, even in areas where they cooper-
ate effectively. The transatlantic differences and ten-
sions that have steadily arisen through the 1990s in
the Balkans, evidenced by a major cleavage in trans-
atlantic unity over conflict management in Kosovo,
culminated in the 'transatlantic trauma' associated
with the Iraq war in 2003. Although both US and
European states share many common threat assess-
ments, they disagree over how best to manage these
threats, and in particular how, when and why to de-
ploy coercive force. This strategic-conceptual gap
is exacerbated by military-technological capability
asymmetries amongst states within the region. At
its extreme, this has been presented as a dichotomy
between European unilateral passivism and US uni-
lateral activism. As a result, policy-makers and ana-
lysts alike have suggested that we face one of three
possible futures: an amiable separation (Daalder,
'End of Atlanticism'); strategic divorce (Kagan,
'Power and Weakness '); or, strategic realignment and
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renewal (Asmus and Pollack, 'New Transatlantic
Project').
As these strategic disputes, tensions and am-
biguities have arisen the transatlantic security com-
munity is set to enlarge. The political will within
NATO and the EU, expressed at the 21-22 Novem-
ber 2002 Prague NATO Summit and 12-l3 Decem-
ber 2002 EU Copenhagen Summit respectively, to
integrate new members in May 2004 will have an
impact on institutions, security policies in the Euro-
Atlantic region. However, NATO at 26 and the EU
at 25 will be profoundly different entities than NATO
at 19 and the EU at 15 (particularly as 19 out of the
25 EU states will also be NATO allies). The EU will
increase its collective population by 20% and the
GDP from between 5-9% and small member EU
states will increase from 10 to 19 of the 25 members
(Batt et aI, 2003: 17).
Although it could be argued that the 'variable
geometry' between NATO and the EU will be re-
duced, it should also be noted that as there will be
less diversity outside the EU and NATO so there will
be greater diversity within it. Relations of newly
integrated states with neighbours thatare not yet in-
tegrated will be changed as these institutions further
enlarge: the EU-Balkans Thessaloniki Summit in
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June 2003 endorsed the belief and aspiration that the
entire region be integrated into the EU over the next
decade, whilst both Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-
Herzegovina look to integrate into PiP by 2004. Dual
enlargement has the potential to generate a number
of asymmetric impacts within the Euro-Atlantic se-
curity region: between existing EU and NATO mem-
ber states; between old and first echelon members;
between security policies within these organizations
that stress competitive or cooperative functional di-
vision of labour (that is, in terms of roles, missions
and duties) between these organizations; between EU
and NATO member states and those that will inte-
grate by May 2004; and, between those that have the
ability to integrate and those states that either do not
or in which NATO and EU their current elites and
publics perceive integration as a distant long-term
generational strategic objective. Let us examine
some of the issues that arise in relation to the asym-
metric impact of dual enlargement in greater detail.
2. Euro-Atlantic Strategic
Divorce or Strategic Renewal?
The 1999 Kosovo campaign highlighted the
dangers in the eyes of some NATO members of con-
ducting a war by committee. The U.S. administra-
tion saw NATO's cumbersome decision-making
structures as detrimental to the achievement of 'clo-
sure' or victory in the campaign, whilst the U.K. ar-
gued that the U.S. lack of political will to rule in the
possible use of ground troops at the beginning of the
air campaign undermined the deterrent effect of
NATO. The Kosovo campaign also served to reopen
the discussion of the capabilities, technology, and
power projection disparities between the U.S. and
other NATO member states. (Clark, 2001: 427.) The
low defence expenditures of the European NATO
member states and the largely static nature of their
force structures were exposed, raising again ongo-
ing debates over optimal burden sharing and divi-
sion of labour within NATO. Moreover, some old
NATO member states, as well as new first echelon
members, were perceived to have performed poorly,
with political elites not spending political capital to
persuade their publics about the necessity and virtue
of NATO intervention.
The shocking impact of 9/11 determined that
the Bush administration 'would seek to dominate the
international system to such an extent that no strate-
gic challenge would ever again be posed.' (Lyndley-
French, 2002: 802) The 'lessons learned' from
Kosovo impacted heavily on the transatlantic re-
sponse to 9111. The diplomatic failure of the US to
engage European NATO Allies post 9/11 - even as
they offered 'unlimited solidarity' - undermined
NATO's relevance. Although NATO's support
proved politically useful, the US rejected European
NATO offers for the alliance to engage as NATO in
war fighting in Afghanistan: 'The Bush administra-
tion viewed NATO's historic decision to aid the
United States under Article 5 less as a boon than a
booby trap.' (Kagan, 2003: 102) In the words of the
US Secretary of State for Defence: 'the mission de-
fined the coalition, not the coalition the mission'.
The implications ofGWOT and US-led and inspired
'coalitions of the willing' - a fa carte multilateralism
- for NATO were apparent.
A third dynamic occurred with the November
2002 NATO Prague Summit and the debates that
preceded it were shaped by lessons learned from
Kosovo, but also the imperatives that flowed from
9/11. As a result, NATO focused attention on three
new issues. Firstly, 'new capabilities' - the capa-
bilities of NATO allies had to be improved and the
'Prague Capabilities Commitment' (PCC) tackled
this issue. In the context of GWOT, new NATO
members were strongly encouraged to reform their
internal security structures - the civil-military focus
of the MAP process was extended to include more
explicitly civil-security sector reform in which se-
curitylintelligence services, Ministries of Interior,
border guards etc. could all perform a role within
the GWOT paradigm. NATO's Response Force
(NRF) was to be the catalyst and most visible and
useful objective ofPCC. The NRF was to be a 21,000
strong force, technologically advanced, deployable,
interoperable and sustainable by 2006, with 2000
troops to be sustainable for operating in the field for
14-30 days by October 2003. It was understood to
be a means of improving the NATO capabilities of
European states at no additional spending it would
help to keep NATO interoperable through intense
periods of training and missions and would be de-
ployed to Afghanistan under German-Dutch leader-
ship.
Secondly, 'new members' - a decision to inte-
grate seven new members in second echelon enlarge-
ment was taken - and this included the three Baltic
States. However, second echelon enlargement was
shaped by the first echelon post-integration perform-
ance. A number of' lessons learned' have been iden-
tified, which suggest security policy implications for
second echelon integration states. Following the
experience of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland,
it is likely that what ever the force structure of cur-
rent prospective NATO member states is now, that
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structure will change in the future after accession.
All new members will face budgetary constraints as
they attempt to restructure their military and consti-
tutional and legal system inadequacies will persist
and have to be addressed, along with changes to na-
tional security doctrines, military concepts and doc-
trines. Incompatibilities between national and NATO
defence planning will appear and will have to be ad-
dressed and it appears questionable whether the pub-
lics and elites will continue to support NATO mem-
bership to the same extent post-accession as in the
pre-accession period. The lack of support for the
Kosovo campaign in the public and elites of the
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, the poor rate
of defence reform and force restructuring these states
had 'undertaken since integration and low rates of
defence expenditure was compounded by the fact that
it was 'more difficult to gain compromise once the
new allies were members.' (Simon, 2003) 'One bit-
ten twice shy' was the watchword - and with it the
realization that NATO could only exert refonn pres-
sure on new members through exclusion; once inte-
grated leverage was lost.
Thirdly, 'new relationships' - the NATO-Rus-
sian relations were placed on a firmer footing by the
creation of NATO-Russia Council. (Kay, 2003)
Russia-NATO relations were becoming routinised
under the Russia-NATO Council, as a practical con-
tent of activities were developed, and an administra-
tive capacity and a shared institutionalized culture
gained root. Russia continued to promote security
co-operation with the US in GWOT and despite
Putin's objections to the Iraq war - the issue was not
discussed within the Russia-NATO Council forum-
but rather through bilateral discussions between
Washington D.C. and Moscow. The framework of
Russian-US strategic partnership rather than the in-
stitution of NATO was favoured and this trend fur-
ther underscores NATO's increasingly limited rel-
evance to transatlantic relations.
However, the latent tensions exposed by
Kosovo had transformed into simmering disagree-
ment and discontent not so much by the US declara-
tion of a GWOT and intervention into Afghanistan,
but by the way in which the 'coalition of the will-
ing' intervened and the implications that held for US
security policy in the Bush administration. Open
cleavages within the transatlantic security commu-
nity continued to surface, particularly in France pre-
occupied with the exercise of US 'hyper-power' and
Germany, as the Chancellor was caught in a close
political election and politicized his party's (SPD)
opposition to US 'adventurism' to capture critical
floating voters and bolster his Green Party coalition
allies. The 'Bush Doctrine' of pre-emption (US
National Security Strategy of September 2002)
against states that currently threaten the US or that
might conceivably threaten US primacy was under-
stood by some alliance members in terms of neo-
imperial 'adventures', to be opposed or counter-bal-
anced through a greater emphasis on NATO or other
multilateral institutions such as the U .
(Stelzenmueller, 2002: 9)
Although many pre-emptive wars have oc-
curred in history, the US-led invasion ofIraq - 'Op-
eration Iraqi Freedom' - on 20 March 2003 repre-
sented the first pre-emptive war in accordance with
the US September 2002 Strategic Doctrine. 'Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom' can be understood as the fourth
dynamic as it ushered in 'an era in which the US has
thrown off the constraints and balances of the multi-
lateral system and exercised its enormous political
and military supremacy on its own terms.' (Baker et
ai, 2003: 17) UN Security Council Resolution 1441
brought fully into the open cleavages between 18
European states and France, Germany, Russia, Bel-
gium and Luxemburg, and between the US and Tur-
key (where the US strategic partnership with Turkey
was deemed to be 'in tatters'). Current European
NATO members signed 'Letter of Eight? in support
of the US position on Iraq, and days later a further
10 European states - the 'Vilnius 10' - added to this
majority. The so-called 'Chocolate Summit' held in
Brussels by the 'Gang of Four' (Belgium, France,
Germany and Luxembourg) was grist to the mill of
those that pointed to 'strategic divorce'. These splits
now appeared fundamental in nature and constituted
a crisis for NATO, only comparable in NATO his-
tory to the Suez Crisis of 1956, when the US op-
posed a French-UK led 'coalition of willing' occu-
pation of the Suez canal, to the point of forcing a
humiliating retreat on its erstwhile allies.
These dynamics both generated and illustrated
tensions and cleavages that were cumulative in na-
ture, but driven over the immediate short-term by
French, German and Russian opposition to US in-
tervention in Iraq without a second UN resolution.
This opposition, whilst reflecting the overwhelming
popular sentiment - also served to highlight Euro-
pean inability to either stop through political diplo-
matic means, or indeed emulated through military
power the US-led intervention. It merely under-
scored the realization that Europe lacked sufficient
military power coupled with a political determina-
tion to become a global strategic power through the
exercise of military force ('hard power').
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The Iraq crisis also demonstrated that the US
was prepared to deal with like-minded EU states in-
dividually, rather than attempt to deal with the EU
as a unified whole. The widely reported statement
attributed to Condolessa Rice underscored this per-
ception, to the effect that US post-Iraq policy towards
Europe was to 'Punish the French, ignore the Ger-
mans, forgive the Russians' and presumably reward
the Spanish and the British? Such disaggregating or
'cherry-picking' isolates opponents on any given is-
sue and undermines the European project, and this
may further undermine the rose-tinted vision of trans-
atlantic renaissance. It also undermines any attempts
to generate 'credibility, cohesion, convergence, com-
mitment and candour', the prerequisites for transat-
lantic re-coupling. (Lindley-French, 2003: 76)
Solana, for example, has argued that: 'such an ap-
proach would not only contradict generations of
American wisdom, it would also be profoundly mis-
guided. Different voices must be heard and re-
spected, not ostracized or punished. '
3. Security and Defence
Policy Implications
This ambiguous and unsettled strategic envi-
ronment, coupled with the process of dual enlarge-
ment will have an number of asymmetric impacts on
the defence and security policies of states in the Euro-
Atlantic region, particularly the new entrants to
NATO and the EU. Firstly, it brings with it the need
to effectively fulfil the duties and responsibilities of
membership. The US in particular asks two key ques-
tions of the new allies. Will the candidates' com-
mitment democracy strengthen the alliance's ability
to protect and promote its security, value and inter-
ests? Can NATO be confidant that a candidates'
commitment to democracy and the alliances values
be enduring? In military terms these questions trans-
late more practically into the challenge of EU and
NATO membership in balancing a need to both de-
velop high intensity niche capabilities/specialized
roles in NATO's Response Force (NRF) and promote
peacekeepers to support the middle and lower end
Petersberg tasks, which the European Rapid Reac-
tion Force (ERRF) is likely to undertake. Can the
Baltic and SE European sates advance on two fronts
at once or do they have to choose one due to finance,
personnel and administrative and institutional capac-
ity shortfalls and limitations? Both tasks have the
potential to unbalance their militaries and create ten-
sions in defence planning, contingencies and tasking
arenas.
On the one hand role specialization for the
NRF increases 'strategic partnership' with the US
and opens up the possibility of integration into 'coa-
litions of the willing'. But such participation would
be symbolic at best - their contribution is not needed
militarily - and could be potentially unpopular at
home depending on war fighting casualties and the
gap between perceived necessity of the pre-emption
against the perceived imminence of the threat. On
the other hand Peace Support Operation preparation
with the ERRF would be more popular domestically,
but it is far from clear of the ERRF has the decision-
making capacity, finance and political will to oper-
ate in a meaningful manner and the doubts can only
increase as the EU moves to 25. Thus, whilst it might
have been argued - half in jest - that the best inter-
ests of the SE European and Baltic States within a
transatlantic security alliance would be to 'join any
emerging consensus' in order to maximize their in-
fluence, the dynamic events ofthe last few years ar-
gue that such a policy is now untenable. The US
Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld has noted:
'The distinction between old and new Europe today
is not really of a matter of age or size or even geog-
raphy. It is a matter of attitude, of the vision that
countries bring to the trans-Atlantic relationship.'
(Rumsfeld 2003) French President Jacques Chirac
also exacerbated splits through his undiplomatic
comments in February 2003 in response to the V 10
letter of support for the US: 'If they had wanted to
diminish the chances of joining Europe, they could
not have found a better way.' Bluntly put: which is
more important for Baltic and SE European States -
European or American priorities?
Secondly, it places a stress on relations with
both traditional regional partners and near neigh-
bours. The attitudes of Baltic elites, for example,
and the choices they make will place a pressure on
the ability oftheir foreign and defence establishments
to maintain cohesion in foreign and security policy
formation and implementation once accession to
NATO and the EU has been achieved. It is highly
likely that - just as after the Benelux bloc or Iberian
Peninsula integration - the constituent parts followed
their own on occasion divergent interests, and ac-
cession will lead to a greater fragmentation of the
Baltic States in foreign and security matters. This,
in turn will reduce the collective geopolitical weight
of the Baltic bloc as a whole, but increase the bar-
gaining power and influence of individual states in
new informal alliances and partnerships within the
EU and NATO. This has implications for civil-mili-
tary relations in the region. Intra-Baltic foreign
policy co-operation within the military-security sec-
tor - widely perceived as the jewel in the crown of
intra-Baltic co-operation - the most active,
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interoperable (personnel, materiel, infrastructure)
and effective example of practical and meaningful
co-operation.
The relationship between the three Baltic
states and their Nordic neighbours - states which
had extended sovereignty support and played the
critical role of strategic partners through the 1990s-
channelling military materiel and advice to guide
democratic security building efforts and strategic
reorientation westwards - is also placed under stress
by this changing strategic environment. Some ana-
lysts have argued that Nordic unity is 'in tatters', as
the US-led coalition in Iraq has received symbolic
support from the Poles and Danes, whilst Sweden
has called 'illegal' and a 'breach of international law' .
Baltic integration into NATO may increase the per-
ception that Finnish and Swedish non-alignment rep-
resents a redundant security strategy - indeed, Fin-
land currently participate in all NATO activities but
the collective defence role. Lastly, as with Poland
and Romania, the Baltic States are ahead of the Nor-
dic states in offering aid to post-conflict rehabilita-
tion phase of the Iraq operation - contributing on a
per capita basis as much as the UK - than the Nordic
states. Such a realignment of power and support in
the Baltic region will impact on the ability and will-
ingness of the Nordic states to continue to offer such
close co-operative military assistances and collabo-
ration with their Baltic neighbours. Although it is
impossible to quantify, this emergent process will
have an impact on the nature and quality of civil-
military relations within and between the Baltic
States.
In SE Europe similar dynamics are at work.
Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, states that will in-
tegrate into NATO in 2004, have argued that the ex-
tension of NATO membership to all states in the
Western Balkans is critical to stability in the region
and praised the role of the SE European Stability
Pact (Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and
Albania joined the Pact in 1999). The Adriatic Char-
ter, modelled on the Baltic Charter developed in 1997
as a compensatory alternative to first echelon NATO
membership, has been offered to Albania, Croatia,
and Macedonia as compensation for failure to gain
second echelon integration. It plays much the same
function as the Baltic Charter: it encourages new and
intensifies existing co-operation between these states,
as well as demonstrating a co-operative capacity
thereby strengthening the possibility of third echelon
membership.
Adriatic Charter states clearly perceived the
US to be the engine of second echelon NATO en-
largement and the motor of possible third echelon
integration. Slovenia, though, has suggested that it
can shoulder responsibilities Greece and Italy cur-
rently undertake as strategic partners offering 'sov-
ereignty support' and promoting democratic secu-
rity building in the Western Balkans - particularly
the former Yugoslavia. Slovenia has peacekeepers
in BiH, Macedonia and Kosovo, active economic
investments in he region and has stressed the impor-
tance of EU integration of theses states. The EU-
Balkan Summit of June 2003 has reaffirmed the EU's
desire to eventually integrate all Balkan states into
the Union. As Slovene Prime Minister Anton Rop
stated: 'The EU has shown that the integration of
the Balkan states is one of the priority tasks.' (STA
news agency, Ljubljana, 21 June 2003) The neces-
sity of integration was underlined by Lord Robertson,
who has argued that border controls need to be
strengthened in order to fight organised crime - a
key threat to regional stability: 'either he region takes
control of its borders or the criminals will take con-
trol of the region.' (Agence France Press, May 22,
2003)
However, there are a number of challenges to
stability and security that must be overcome before
integration into EU and NATO can be realised. Some
are relatively straightforward. Although in Albania
90% of the population support NATO membership,
it has low democratic standards - but this can be
enhanced by continued EU integration and the sup-
port of near neighbours. It is not entirely clear
whether the Bulgarian and Romanian experience is
relevant for and could be transferred to the South
Caucasus or the Balkan region. BiH represents an-
other challenge, which poses far harder policy ques-
tions for the EU and neighbouring states. Firstly,
the state has little internal cohesion, with 13 Prime
ministers, 180 Ministers and 760 legislators within
three entities lead by nationalist leaders with a zero
sum mentality. BiH can only be supervised through
the international supervisory administration and cen-
tral to its success will be the policies of neighbour-
ing states and the unity of the international commu-
nity forcing reforms - including the non-toleration
of anti-Dayton factions - in a comprehensive and
unified manner.
In addition, near neighbours do not have com-
prehensive policies towards BiH. Two-thirds of
BiH's borders are shared with Croatia: 'It is the pri-
mary transit country for international forces and sup-
plies to this totally landlocked country, and Croatia's
many ports and roads along the Adriatic are BiH's
lifelines to the world.' (Raguz, 2003) While the
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new Croatian government has withdrawn outright
support for Croats in BiH to be integrated into
Croatia, it is not yet apparent what will replace the
'BiH-breakup' policy. The State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro has a huge reform process to implement
after the assassination of Prime Minister Djinjic in
February 2003, and difficulties are compounded by
the possible independence of Montenegro in 2-3
years, following the election in early 2003 of a pro-
independence president. The status of Kosovo also
has yet to be decided and this has the potential to
impact on relations with the West, although it is be-
ing at least discussed within the context of KFOR-
Belgrade dialogue and with the EU's Stability and
Association Tracking Mechanism (the SAP equiva-
lent for Kosovo). The current Belgrade government
has stopped military ties between Belgrade and Banja
Luka in Respublica Srpska, but have continued eco-
nomic ties - though leading generals in the VS army
are no longer paid by Belgrade nor do they continue
to receive former JNA military equipment. This
abandonment ofthe Respublika Srpska national lead-
ership has generated a backlash in the entity, with
politicians in Banja Luka calling those in Belgrade
'traitors' .
Moreover, the power and credibility of the in-
ternational community is weak. The Bush adminis-
tration is progressively turning over Balkan respon-
sibilities to the EU, including the long-term devel-
opment of the region and short-term crisis manage-
ment, reducing both US funding and troops in and
for the region. The EU is utilising a number of in-
struments to this end: region wide Stability Pact pro-
viding a framework for concrete projects;
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) which
maps steps towards association then membership of
the EU; and, Community Assistance for Reconstruc-
tion, Development, Stabilization (CARDS). Al-
though the EU is the most powerful force for reform
and the prospect of membership makes policies more
effective and reliable, it has been undermined by the
failure of its past engagement with the region. EU
security promises and action have little credibility
in BiH after the massacres at Srebrenica on 11 July
1995. This trust will be hard to replace. (Abramovitz
& Hurbunt, 2003)
Current EU member state policies appear split,
with ESDP coherence losing out to the national poli-
cies of national governments. When policy reform
issues are brought to the table EU unity is on occa-
sion lacking and this damages the prospect for BiH
state consolidation. Two examples will illustrate this.
Some European NATO (and EU) member states ar-
gue that despite the lack of a pan-Federation MoD,
BiH with its Standing Committee on Military Mat-
ters might still be integrated into PfP, whilst others
insist that such a double standard cannot be toler-
ated. The EU and US also do not provide a united
front. The day the US suspended international aid
to BiH in response for the lack of action against war
criminals (having published its Black List of sus-
pected criminals), particularly Radovan Karadic and
Ratko Mladic, the EU made available a loan of$1 00
m. and proceeded to remove key individuals from a
list it had created after intensive lobbying from some
European capitals.'
A further consideration - in the Balkans more
than the Baltic States - is the extent to which the
changing US military footprint or military presence
in Europe will impact on security politics in the re-
gion. The changing US military presence is ongo-
ing and responds to the necessity of policing the 'new
American perimeter'. (Donnelly, 2003) It is gov-
erned by four principles that will ensure that US in-
terests and those of its allies are upheld. Firstly the
reconfiguration must advance US strategic interests;
it should allow the US to respond more effectively
to the asymmetric challenges of the 2151 century. The
potential for sources of insecurity spilling over from
the Middle East to Central Asia, Caspian, Caucasus,
Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean to the Balkans is
real and must be addressed. Africa, as a possible
location of Al-Qa'idah and an area of rising strate-
gic importance to the US (it is forecast that West
Africa could supply 25% of US oil imports) could
also be an area of future deployments. Secondly, it
should have an operational impact by increasing
American ability to respond to current threats, and
facilitate and enhance ongoing transformation from
industrial to digital age. As NATO moves east then
so does its centre of gravity and US reconfiguration
reflects this reality. At the same time a balance be-
tween 'lightness' and 'lethality' must be maintained.
Thirdly and fourthly, it has a political and economic
component in that the maintenance of old bases or
creation of new ones should not be driven by wholly
by political or economic considerations, though eco-
nomic prudence and political ties can and do enter
the equation. (Spence & Hulsman, 2003)
These principles entail a switch from build-
ing large, heavily staffed garrisons, towards a more
modem basing paradigm. General Jones has spoken
of the creation of 'bare bones bases' or 'lilly pads',
noting that a Pentagon study in 2002 as noted that
20% of the 499 bases in Germany are no longer 'ter-
ribly usable.' (Graham, 2003) Instead, he supports
smaller, lighter more scattered bases in which prepo-
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sition equipment and skeleton 6-month rotating staff
(without dependencies) can respond with greater
speed and flexibility to deployments out of area. It
is thought that while some 'enduring value' bases
will be maintained, such as the airbase at Ramstein
in Germany or Aviano in Italy, and the overall number
of US troops in Europe will continue (appro x 112,000
with 84% in Germany), the location of these troops
will change. For example, the two US divisions (each
division has 15,000 troops) in Germany, the 1st Ar-
moured Division (15,000 soldiers) attached the Vth
Corps near Heidelberg and the 1st Infantry Division,
currently in Iraq, will only have a brigade (between
3-5000 troops) redeployed to Germany after the Iraq
operation. The balance will be sent back to the US
or deployed to the 'Iilly pads'.
Discussions are ongoing as to where these
'lillypads' might be located and those assets, which
have been used for operations over the Balkans or in
Iraq, are the most likely contenders. In Poland the
Krzesinsky air base near Poznan has been mentioned,
in Hungary the Taszar airbase. In Romania the Mihail
Kogalniceanu air base near Constanta, the Babadag
training ground and Mangalia port are all under con-
sideration. In Bulgaria, the airfields of Dobritch in
the NE and Kroumovo in the South and Graf
Ignatievo near Plovdiv are all discussed, as are the
ports of Burgas and Varna and training grounds of
Koren and Novo Selo.
The experience of the Iraq war has impacted
on the necessity of reconfiguration. The lack of po-
litical support amongst some allies - a lack that con-
trasted sharply with Vilnius 10 support - had opera-
tional consequences for US military effectiveness.
It took several days delay before the Pentagon could
get permission to deploy US Army l73rd Airborne
Brigade to parachute into Northern Iraq. Austria did
not make its rail network available for US forces and
German, French and Turkish opposition to the war
provides a reason to decrease future dependence.
Public support for US military presence, aims and
objectives within Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and
Hungary is greater than within 'Old Europe' and this
lessens threats to deny access to such infrastructure
located on their territory. Moreover, the economic
benefits of the location of such bases - even the lower
cost 'lilly pads' - will likely maintain or increase
public support. EUCOM HQ at Stuggart puts $150-
$175 m into the local economy and after 3 months
of US use of Con stanza port in Romania, $30 m was
inserted into the local economy. (Fuller, 3003)
The military benefits are clear: as well as
greater geo-strategic flexibility that location closer
to conflict brings (for example, less mid-air refuel-
ling for tactical range F-16s), the less restrictive en-
vironmentallegislation as this allows more live fire
exercises, training manoeuvres in heavily tracked
vehicles, helicopter night flights and this will con-
tribute to an ability to maintain a higher level ofmili-
tary readiness and joint exercises with host nation
militaries will help increase the interoperability of
new NATO member states. At the same time as con-
solidating political ties with these states, basing the
US military in both Bulgaria and Turkey will shift
the basing burden from Turkey and provide diplo-
matic cover to Turkish politicians when actions be-
come regional initiatives rather than solely US-Turk-
ish efforts.
The US and Europe face the same threats of
WMD proliferation and terrorism and NATO is the
anchor of US security relations with Europe.
(Brezinski, 2003) However, the eastwards and south-
wards tread of the lighter US footprint does raise
security policy implications that may emerge and will
have to be managed, though as yet are not apparent.
Will Germany feel diplomatically snubbed and re-
sent the economic (and cultural) impact of the move?
Certainly, the majority of US bases are in three
Lander and so radical basing changes would have
economic and political consequences in Rheinland
Plaz, Hessen and Bavaria. Will appropriate political
contact between the US and Germany suffer; will a
'strategic seam' be broken and might this not then
be exploited?
Alternatively, will 'New Europe' generate un-
realistic expectations of the military, economic and
political benefits that will accrue from opening up
of new bases or restoration and extension of exist-
ing Soviet-era bases on their territory? After all, this
very scenario is identified as a threat in Russia's
National Security Concept of 2000, which is still in
operation. Will the Russia-NATO Council allow the
issue of new bases on former Soviet borders and even
the extension of US bases from Central Asia to the
South Caucasus (e.g. Georgia and Azerbaijan) to be
managed, or might Russia begin to object to this in-
creased US presence? Armenia, with US bases al-
ready in Turkey, is unlikely to argue that it is con-
cerned with the proximity of new NATO bases, but
it would be concerned if the arrival of these bases
negatively impacted on Russia-NATO relations. It
might also be argued that the nature of the' lilly pads'
- jump off points for pre-positioned equipment rather
than Okinawa-style mini-American garrisons - helps
immunise them from negative perceptions of over-
bearing US presence.
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However, it may well be that two latent proc-
esses might be realised that undermine this positive
interpretation. Firstly, bureaucratic and institutional
and political considerations might see the 'lilly-pads'
grow in size, thereby negating the benefits of the
lighter footprint and increasing antagonisms from
Russia. Secondly, a realization of the hidden costs
of such a move might also undermine the US DoD's
determination to carry it through. The morale, re-
tention and re-enlistment problem is expected to
grow, as rotation without families increases in a pe-
riod of high operational tempo. Two sets of equip-
ment are needed - one forward and one rear to
carryout training year round and transportation costs
and additional capital costs to renovate new bases
must be considered. Moreover, it can be noted that
there is an air of unreality attached to the notion of
forward basing troops and especially equipment in
'New' rather than 'Old' Europe. The time difference
of deployment from Romania to the Middle East as
opposed to German is a day saved. Presumably, if
heavy forces transit time is critical then they could
be deployed a day earlier from Germany - light forces
two hours earlier.
4. Conclusions
Current dynamics do not allow for a complete
breakdown in transatlantic relations, but they are
disruptive enough not to promote a reconciliation
and then renewal. Instead we are faced with strate-
gic disequilibrium or strategic dissonance in trans-
atlantic relations, an environment with three key fea-
tures. Firstly, the constancies of US 'hard' military
power and EU 'soft' economic and political power
increase over the next years. Secondly, the US al-
though maintaining a broadly unilateral proactive and
pre-emptive foreign policy, does work harder at se-
curing allies as the costs - military, political, eco-
nomic - of sustaining GWOT at its current opera-
tional tempo become apparent to the Bush adminis-
tration. Thirdly, and paradoxically, the stronger the
EU becomes as a 'soft' power (the greater its ability
to integrate first and then second echelon members)
the larger the membership, the harder it becomes to
generate strategic consensus within the EU for com-
mon foreign policy and possible military interven-
tion in all but the lowest common denominator (i.e.
'sub-Zimbabwe') actions: the accumulation of EU
'soft' power precludes its ability to generate 'hard'
power. As a result of disagreement over threat per-
ception, attempts to formulate a coherent, symmet-
ric Euro-Atlantic response to manage these asym-
metric threats is at present lacking. The Euro-Atlan-
tic security community may attempt to manage the
threats by strengthening global institutions; increas-
ing Euro-Atlantic institutional co-operation; or adopt-
ing a compartmentalized and differentiated approach
over a range of issues that combines institutional co-
operation, competition, and ad hoc coalitions. Time
will tell.
'New Europe' band wagoning as a security
strategy may well prove to be the most effective in
the context of current transatlantic relations. This
will allow the new entrants to maximise gains - par-
ticularly strategic partnership with the US that will
be underpinned by greater US military assistance.
However, the role of 'balancer' might well recom-
mend itself to the larger of the CEE states. Poland,
an existing NATO state, has a geopolitical weight
that can shape the strategic balance (it represents that
oft quoted 'tipping point') between NATO European
member states and the US - as evidenced by e for-
mation of the Polish Division in Iraq. Romania
amongst the new entrants might well wish to lead a
sub-regional political and economic system, but as
it seeks EU membership by 2007 it is likely that
Romanian priorities will not - at least publicly - stray
too far from the EU consensus, at least until mem-
bership is secured.
However, the dual enlargement in 2004 will
render 'New' Europe less amenable to supporting
US foreign and security policy when it is at variance
with elites and publics in Europe and the necessity
of securing EU integration. This tendency to down-
grade transatlantic ties against the desire to focus on
economic security issues associated with the EU may
well be balanced by GWOT and the necessity of
counter-terrorist cooperation. Whilst it is true that
the US over-militarizes foreign and security policy
and the EU over civilianizes it, the realization that
transnational terrorists can be best countered through
a combination of90% non-military (political, diplo-
matic, economic and financial strategies) and only
10% military efforts will bring the focus back to com-
bining and consolidating the 'soft' -' hard' power
nexus and financing each element accordingly. An
acceptance of this calculation by political elites -
particularly the US, French and British governments
- may help realign and rebalance US with European
power and this dynamic will manage the role of the
new entrants to the EU and NATO.
Baltic and SE European/Balkan civil-military
relations have their part to play in consolidating trans-
atlantic security relations in the 21 st century. Will
these regions represent 'Atlantic Europe' alongside
the UK and the Netherlands, or 'Core Europe' along-
..•
JULY - SEPTEMBRE 2003 107
side France and Germany? Or is it possible that their
actual contribution to international security will be
primarily non-military in nature and that they will
become de facto part of 'Non-aligned Europe', and
be useful as a bridge to 'Periphery Europe'? That
these questions can still be asked indicates the ex-
1 The views expressed in this article are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the
United States Department of Defense, the German Ministry of
Defence, or the United States and German Governments.
tent to which dual enlargement has the potential to
both undermine and underpin existing trends in trans-
atlantic relations. The answers to these questions
are in the hands of the elites in the Vilnius 10 capi-
tals as much as Brussels and Washington DC.
•
NOTES
2 The eight NATO members were Britain, Italy, Portugal, Spain,
Denmark, Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary.
3 US Secretary of State Powell certified its compliance on June
15th. Serbia and Montenegro did however lose $278K of IMET
funds because it has not yet signed a waiver on the ICC (along
with many other states).
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